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Rising income inequality is an anglo Saxon problem. For most of the other
OECD countries, earnings dispersion is rather persistent. Vertical mobility is to
be taken into account. The paper also looks at the relationship of income
inequality, growth and employment. It elaborates the point that equity orienta-
tion affects the incentive system of an economy and can lead to higher un-
employment.
J.E.L-Klassifikation: D3, D6, 13, J00/. The empirical picture'
1. The topic of rising income inequality is an anglo-saxon problem. According to
World Bank data for a large sample of countries, Gini coefficients on market in-
come have increased in the last four decades for the Unites States, the United
Kingdom and New Zealand (Table 1 in the appendix). The trend is insignificant
for most of the other industrialized countries, among them (West)Germany,
1.
2
and for some developing countries including the Asian NICs. For France
3 and
Italy, two of the larger continental European countries, it is even negative. This
picture is more or less confirmed by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) for
most of the OECD countries (Table 2). In the eighties and early nineties, the
Gini coefficients for disposable income increased for the anglo-saxon countries,
now also including Australia; they also rose for the Netherlands, Sweden and
Japan. For the other OECD countries there was no significant trend. In most
countries, income distribution seems to be quite persistent.
As an example for the trends in income distribution, take the earnings dis-
persion (for men) measured by the D9/D1 ratio which shows a steady increase
* This is a comment to a paper with the same title by Joseph Stiglitz, Symposium
Jncome Inequality: Issues and Policy Options", Sponsored by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wy, August 27-29, 1988. This paper is a
rational expectation comment and had to be written before the paper to be com-
mented on was available. I appreciate critical remarks from Alfred Boss and Rainer
Thiele.
1 Biewen (1998) finds a slight reduction of income inequality in West Germany for the
period 1985-1996. Note that changes in-the Gini coefficients are affected by the
choice of the equivalence scale for household size. For instance, there is a slight in-
crease in the Gini coefficient in 1995 according to the Bundesamt-scale and a de-
crease according to the OECD scale (Biewen 1998, tables 1 and 5). Burkhauser et
al. (1988) show a slight increase in the Gini coefficient in the period 1994-1995 for
labor earnings and in the period 1992-1996 for post government income (Table 3).
2 In East Germany inequality has risen during 1990-1996. In reunified Germany
inequality has drastically reduced due to the growth of mean income in East Ger-
many.
3 Income distribution remained nearly constant in France according to Atkinson,
Rainwater and Smeeding (1995).-2-
in the eighties and the nineties for the US and the UK whereas the ratio re-
mains constant for West Germany; in terms of the level of dispersion, the ratio
of the US is the double of that of West Germany (Figure 1).
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employees are ranked in order of their earnings from lowest to highest.
Source: Siebert (1998) according to data from OECD (1996), Table 3.1.
2. Before deriving policy conclusions in terms of a more equity oriented redistri-
butional policy, we should be aware that the income distribution observed within
a given year is only a snapshot. The snapshot dispersion does not fully capture
the longer-term picture, since there is vertical mobility of individuals over time
across the income distribution. Within a five-year period, there is a considerable
vertical mobility in the OECD countries. Over that period, in the United Kingdom
and the United States slightly more than half of the employees move up one or
more quintiles (Table 3). In Germany (46.9) and France (43.2) a smaller per-
centage moves upward. A time horizon longer than five years appears to be
associated with stronger vertical mobility in the United States (Addison 1997).-3-
For low-paid workers below 65 percent of median earnings, mobility across the
income distribution varies considerably between OECD countries. More than
half of them are in a higher earning status after five years in Italy (69.8 percent),
Denmark (68.3 percent), the United Kingdom (52.9 percent) and France (50.2
percent) in contrast to Germany (44 percent) and the United States (26.9 per-
cent). In some countries, a large proportion of low-paid workers leave full-time
employment (Germany, 40.5 percent; United States 39.2 percent). In general, a
low share of low-paid workers in total employment (Italy 10 percent, France 11
percent compared to the United States 27,5 percent) seems to be associated
with a high vertical mobility (Table 4 and OECD, 1996a, Table 3.9). However,
this finding may be somewhat deceptive, since lower wage dispersion means
by definition a smaller proportion of low-paid workers, and so their greater
mobility is occurring across a more compressed income distribution.
4
Taking vertical mobility in the earning dispersion into account an unequal
earning distribution in a specific year gives less cause for concern.
//. Income inequality and growth
3. One aspect of income inequality is its relationship with economic growth and
development. This relationship has been studied in two different directions. The
traditional line of research is how growth and development affect income distri-
bution. At the core of this debate was the Kuznetz hypothesis (1955) that
inequality rises in the process of economic development and then falls again
(inverted u-curve). The more recent empirical evidence tends to reject for this
hypothesis (Bruno et al. 1996). In quite a few countries with spectacular growth
4 When Shorrocks R is used to analyze the permanent part in labor income inequality
or in post-government income inequality, the United States has higher levels of in-
come inequality and a higher permanent share of post-government inequality in the
80s and the 90s than Germany (Burkhauser et al. 1998). According to this analysis,
income inequality in Germany is oderately increasing in the nineties, including the
permanent component of post-government income inequality.-4-
rates in the last decades (Japan, Newly Industrializing Countries) the income
distribution has been quite persistent.
The more recent line of research interest is how inequality affects economic
growth or to what extent some amount of equality is a necessary precondition
for growth. There are three mechanisms working towards a negative impact of
inequality on growth:
i) According to the polit-economic approach (Alesina and Rodrick 1994,
Bertola 1993) the median voter prefers a higher level of government
expenditure and of taxation, the more the median is below the mean, i.e. the
more skewed the income distribution is in disfavor of the lower income
groups. A higher level of taxation, however, reduces investment and effort. A
more unequal income distribution therefore should be associated with lower
growth rates.
ii) Another approach stresses political stability as an intervening variable be-
tween income distribution and growth (Alesina and Perotti 1996, Benabou
1996, Benhabib and Rustichini 1996). It is argued that in highly heteroge-
neous and polarized societies interest groups tend to engage in group
specific rent seeking or that under such conditions violence and overthrows
of governments are likely. Rent seeking leads to political control of the
economy by specific groups, to closed markets, cartelization and a general
loss in efficiency. The overthrowing of governments creates political and
economic uncertainty including uncertainty on property rights (risk of expro-
priation and a change of taxation) which is detrimental to investment. Both
effects cement the unequal income distribution and a low increase in eco-
nomic well being (path dependence and hysteresis).
iii) A more unequal income distribution makes it harder for the poorer part of
the population to invest in their human capital, and this will weaken growth.
Groups of the population may get trapped in their low human capital
(hysteresis). Capital markets cannot overcome this trap because information-5-
on future income growth due to human capital formation is not available
(Galorand Zeira 1993; Benabou 1996).
Against this negative impact of an unequal income distribution on economic
growth we have to consider a positive mechanism, i.e. the hypothesis that a
more unequal income distribution is instrumental in a Schumpeterian sense to
bring about a higher level of entrepreneurial effort, work effort and a higher level
of capital accumulation financed by higher savings
5 (on employment see be-
low). Thus taking all arguments together, from a theoretical point of view the
sign of the relationship between inequality and growth is not determined.
Nevertheless, it seems that in a Gedankenexperiment we can indicate some
limits where an increase in inequality will start to have a negative impact on
growth. When inequality leads to instability of a society it is hard to conceive
that this would be beneficial for growth.
4. Most empirical studies estimating reduced-form equations where income
distribution enters a neoclassical growth equation as an additional explanatory
variable obtain a positive relationship between equity and growth (e.g.
Bourguignon 1996; Perotti 1996; Persson and Tabellini 1994). These results
must, however, be taken with a grain of salt because the distribution data used
are of questionable quality (Deininger and Squire 1996). Preliminary estimates
by Deininger and Squire with the more reliable World Bank data show an in-
significant coefficient of the distribution variable when regional dummies are in-
cluded. More empirical research is needed to achieve firm conclusions about
the impact of inequality on growth.
5 Compare the Kaldor hypothesis (1957) that the marginal propensity to save of the
rich is much higher than that of the poor which implies a positive impact of inequality
on aggregate savings.-6-
Structural form estimates discriminating between the different transmission
mechanisms from equity to growth are rare. The existing evidence clearly re-
jects the political economy hypothesis (Perotti 1996) which may be due to the
fact that the lobbying of interest groups dominates median voter behavior in
determining the level of redistribution. There also seems to be no evidence that
income inequality affects aggregate savings across countries (Schmidt-Hebbel
and Serven 1996). By contrast, the mechanisms emphasizing human capital
formation and political instability receive'some empirical support (Perotti 1996;
Alesina and Perotti 1996). The main problem in testing the political instability
hypothesis is to construct an appropriate index of instability. Alesina and Perotti
use an index based on indicators such as the number of coups, political assas-
sinations etc. Their index thus fails to reflect the degree of institutional uncer-
tainty that might prevail in weak albeit constitutional governments. It would be
interesting to re-estimate the instability channel with an index which is more
closely related to the stability of property rights such as that suggested by Barro
(1996).
///. Income inequality, equity orientation and unemployment
5. Another important aspect of income inequality is its relationship with
employment and unemployment. Some argue that a higher income dispersion
will be associated with more unemployment. Their line of reasoning, of course,
is not that a greater earnings dispersion will allow a better matching in the labor
market bringing about labor market equilibria on the different steps of the pro-
ductivity staircase of an economy. And they do not emphasize that in an en-
vironment of higher wage differentiation the prospect of reaching a higher wage
is a strong incentive for human capital formation for the individual employee,
and thus for vertical mobility. Bather, the argument is placed in an insider-out-
sider model of hysteresis where greater unemployment occurs exogenously
(and is considered as not being affected by the extent of wage differentiation).
Once people lose their job, those with previously low labor income are exposed-7-
to a higher risk of getting marginalized. As unemployed they will not have a
chance to improve their human capital out of their own means, and they will not
participate in increases in labor productivity of the economy by training on the
job. Moreover, due to their social status and social environment (including
housing) they are exposed to a much greater risk of social disintegration in-
cluding crime. This is especially relevant if unemployment is concentrated on
ethnic or other subgroups of society (adverse selection). In addition, these
groups will be part of a weaker network that otherwise could be helpful in the
search process for new jobs (Stiglitzand Furman 1998).
Marginalization and disintegration is a phenomenon that cannot be denied. But
in terms of economic policy, marginalization of subgroups of society is not
necessarily an issue of income policy. The first best approach is to attack it by
human capital formation, by improving training on the job, by institutional ap-
proaches to training on the job such as an apprenticeship system, by intro-
ducing a vocational school system, by better schooling in general and by pro-
viding the adequate infrastructure and mending housing and (inner) cities.
Moreover, it is somewhat misleading not to consider vertical mobility.
6.1 would now like to turn the question around and look at the consequences of
a redistributive policy that puts more emphasis on equity. The traditional line of
reasoning is that equity considerations will mean relatively high taxation for
those who can bring an economy forward thus impairing effort and investment.
,,The money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket" (Okun
1975: 91). Redistribution will lead to a loss of economic dynamism and conse-
quently to weaker investment, lower growth and less employment. Witness the
incapability of the German political system to agree on a tax reform in
1997/1998, mainly for equity reasons. A more blunt reminiscence is off course
the erosion of the equity orientated centrally planned economies in Eastern
Europe.-8-
7. But my argument is more subtle. I am interested in the relationship of the
welfare state and unemployment. Equity considerations enter into the incentive
system of an economy in a variety of forms:
i) A more equity oriented society will impose less stringent conditionality con-
ditions on the unemployed. This can be clearly seen in comparing the re-
placement rates and the duration of unemployment benefits of the United
States, the United Kingdom and Germany (Table 5). In Germany un-
employment benefits of type I (Arbeitslosengeld) is paid for one year as a
rule, it goes up to 32 months for those over 45 years; unemployment benefit
of type II (Arbeitslosenhilfe) is indefinite.
ii) Social welfare tends to be more gracious in countries that are equity
oriented. In Germany again, social welfare benefits reach 78 percent of the
net wage of the lowest wage group of industry for a family (one earner, one
child). This ratio has gone up from 65,7 percent (1970) to 83,4 percent
(1995) and then declined somewhat. The difference to a market income is
not too large and can be easily bridged in the shadow economy.
iii) With unemployment benefits and social welfare benefits, the welfare state
defines a lower income floor which has an impact on employment. It speci-
fies a reservation wage, and it thus affects search behavior of the un-
employed representing an incentive not to search too intensively. The lower
income floor influences the wage bargaining behavior of trade unions and
employers' association because the unemployed are taken care of by
governmental schemes. And the lower income floor defines the lower corner
stone of the wage structure and thus prevents wage differentiation for the
lower steps of the productivity staircase.
iv) Even when reforming the old age pension system in the continental coun-
tries of Europe, the lower income floor shows up. Pushing back the pay-as-
you system in order to make way for a capital funded system finds a limit as
soon as the pension level of the pay-as-you go system (which now is at 70
percent of net wage income in Germany) is approaching the level of social-9-
welfare benefits for important groups of society.
6 This not only blocks the
introduction of a capital funded system; it is taken by some as an important
motive to do away with a contribution financed pension system altogether
and switch over to a tax based system (which no longer has the positive in-
centive effects associated with contributions).
7
v) Finally, government spending of the welfare state has to be financed by
taxes and social security contributions. This increases the excess burden of
taxation and reduces efficiency. Social security contributions paid by firms
increase the tax wedge and weaken the demand for labor. All in all, the in-
centive mechanisms of an economy with a strong welfare state as the Ger-
man one represent a very complex system that severely contributes to un-
employment (Figure 2).
6 Relative to the standard pension in West Germany, social welfare payments reach
62,6 percent (social assistance including housing, see table). This means that for
some groups receiving less than the standard pension (because of a lower earning
profile or less than 45 years of working life) reducing contribution financed old age
pensions (actually at 70 percent of net wage) in order to make room for a capital
funded system comes close to the level of social welfare payments.
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a) Aged 65 or more.
b) One income earner.
c) Working career of 45 years, average wage income, net of tax.
d) Potential benefits (e.g. means-tested social asistance) neglected.
e) Including irregular transfers of 81 DM (singles) resp. 145 DM (couple).
Source: Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager, own calculations.
7 Another example is the need for wage differentiation. Here, it is more acceptable to























Thus, there are opportunity costs of an equity oriented policy approach in terms
of lower employment and higher unemployment.
8 Putting more emphasis on
equity brings a country into an institutional trap from which it is extremely hard
to escape. This clearly can be observed in the continental countries in Europe.
8. It is difficult to strike a balance between more equity on the one hand and
more efficiency, growth and employment on the other hand. There is a range of
policy issues when equity and efficiency are in conflict. But there also is a range
of problems where equity and efficiency are in harmony. Thus in an evolution-
ary process, the competitive order is instrumental in contributing to a solution of
the social question (Siebert 1992). Moreover, equity considerations should not
ignore the long-run impact of a policy approach. A snapshot equity would
severely limit an improvement in the long-run.
9 It is quite understandable that
people in the United States are concerned with more equity. But before starting
to change the US institutions a very close look should be taken at some of the
experience from the other side of the Atlantic divide, especially from the con-
tinental countries in Europe which have given strong weight to equity con-
siderations in the past.
8 An empirical analysis on the impact of the welfare state on employment is extremely
difficult. An index of the welfare state would have to be confronted with unemploy-
ment rates. Such an index would have to comprise the set of potential causes oi
unemployment. Determining the weights of the components of such an index
(lacking wage differentiation, duration of benefits, replacement ratios, level of wel-
fare payments, lay-off restraints etc.) would presuppose knowing the relevance of
different determinants of unemployment. Besides, international comparisons are
difficult. Thus, one has to rely on tracing the institutional changes of individual
countries over time and looking at their impact (Siebert 1997). There is new evi-
dence, however, that for the OECD countries there is a negative relation between
the level of government expenditure (in percent of GDP) and the creation of jobs
(Heitger 1998). The higher the level of expenditure, the lower the rate of increase of
jobs. This especially holds for consumptive government expenditures; investive
governmental expenditures have a positive effect on employment.
9 Ethical norms should be judged in a general equilibrium including all ramifications in
the economy.-12-
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Source: K. Deiningerand L. Squire (1996).-13- Bibliothek des Instltuts
fur Weltwirtschaft Kiei









































aThe symbols have to be interpreted as follows:
++++ very large increase ( > 30%)
+++ large increase (16 to 29%)
++ moderate increase (10 to 15%)
+ low increase (5 to 10%)
0 zero (-4 to +4%)






















Source: P. Gottschalk and T.M. Smeeding (1997a, 1997b).-14-



































Source: OECD (1996) Table 3.6
Table 4 — Five-Year Earnings Mobility


































a1991 earnings status of 1986 low-paid workers. — ^Defined as below 0.65 median
earnings.
Source: OECD (1996) Table 3.9.-15-
Table 5 — Replacement ratios and duration of benefits in selected countries
Replacement ratio in percent of
previous net wage income
OECD average measure for the
replacement ratio
Duration of benefits')
Levels) of social welfare*
1)
- Single person

































a) Differences between the states.
b) Independent of previous net wage; 60 percent of net wages in the economy for a
married couple with two children (aged under 5 resp. 5-10).
c) Unemployment benefit I (Arbeitslosengeld) for unemployed persons with children
(60 percent otherwise).
d> Unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosenhilfe), means-tested, for unemployed per-
sons with children (53 percent otherwise).
s) Reduction according to the length of the period of unemployment (down to an
absolute minimum of about DM 26 per day).
') Months of unemployment.
g) Social assistance as percentage of net disposable income at average earnings
(after reduction of housing costs from benefits and net wages). When housing is
included the number is higher (Siebert 1998).
h> General assistance (United States: Food stamps, general assistance (by the
states); United Kingdom: Income support; Germany: Subsistence aid (Sozialhilfe);
France: Revenu Minimum d'lnsertion); OECD definition.
') Pennsylvania (Texas: 10 resp. 30 percent).
Source: OECD (1994, 1996b); Sachverstandigenrat (1997).-16-
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